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COMPLEX MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION AND
THE FEDERAL COURTS
STANLEY J. LEVY*
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH ever increasing frequency, litigation resulting from the same
factual events is commenced in more than one federal court or judi-
cial district. Although complex multidistrict litigation may involve any
area of the law, it arises primarily in antitrust, patent infringement, se-
curity fraud and airplane accident cases. Congress and the federal courts
have been faced with the problem of establishing an effective method of
administering multidistrict litigation efficiently while still preserving the
rights of all the parties.
In the early 1960s, the federal courts attempted to handle multidistrict
litigation on an ad hoc basis, often transferring cases or assigning judges
between districts. However, the "Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases,"1
unprecedented in their size and impact on the courts, demonstrated that
existing procedures were inadequate for that type of massive litigation.
Before it was concluded, 2,000 private actions, involving over 25,000
claims, had been commenced in thirty-five separate federal district
courts.2 Had some procedures not been developed to enable the courts to
handle this massive litigation efficiently, these cases could have become
so overburdening as to jeopardize the effective administration of the entire
federal court system.
In order to overcome the threat of impending disaster, the Judicial
Conference of the United States3 established a Coordinating Committee
to examine the difficulties involved in the pretrial stages of multidistrict
* Member of the New York Bar. Mr. Levy received his B.A. magna cum laude from
Harvard College and his LL.B. from Columbia Law School He is presently a member of the
firm of Kreindler & Kreindler, and was formerly Assistant Attorney General of the State of
New York.
1. In the Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases, 29 manufacturers of electrical equipment
were convicted of conspiring to fix prices and allocate business in violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Neal & Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust
Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.BA.J. 621 (1964); see Comment, The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Embryonic Guidelines for the Consolidation of Pretrial Pro-
ceedings, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 786, 787 (1970) [hereinafter cited as The Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation].
2. S. Rep. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 454].
The private actions were brought by aggrieved purchasers under section 4 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 787.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
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litigation.4 Through the cooperation and coordination of the district
judges, consolidated pretrial proceedings were successfully achieved in
the Electrical Equipment Cases. The Coordinating Committee held fre-
quent conferences with the responsible judges and recommended a na-
tional discovery program to replace independent discovery in the individ-
ual districts.5 While this informal coordination enabled the courts to
process the litigation,6 it also demonstrated that such informal coordina-
tion between judges did not provide an effective and efficient method for
administering massive, complex multidistrict litigation. A more formal
statutory procedure was clearly needed.
Upon the recommendation of the Coordinating Committee, legislation
was sought to reduce court congestion, conserve judicial manpower, save
time and expense of the parties and witnesses, and resolve conflicting
discovery demands while still fully protecting the rights of the parties.
The search for greater judicial flexibility led to the enactment of section
14077 to title 28 of the United States Code, which permitted consolidation
of multidistrict litigation for pretrial proceedings.8 More than three years
have elapsed since the enactment of section 1407; it is now appropriate to
analyze how it has worked in practice, and whether it has been an effec-
tive method of handling multidistrict litigation.
II. PROCEDURAL DEVICES AvAILABLE PRIOR TO SECTION 1407
A. Section 292
Prior to the enactment of section 1407, there were few statutory tools
available to handle multidistrict litigation. One such device was the intra
and interdistrict assignment of judges under section 292 of title 28 of the
United States Code. Under this section the chief judge of a circuit could
temporarily assign one of the district judges within the circuit to sit in
any other district within that circuit. For example, in In re Concrete
Pipe,10 Judge Pence of the District Court of Hawaii was designated to sit
in all the districts within the Ninth Judicial Circuit where concrete pipe
cases were pending. Similarly, under this section, in order to ease con-
gestion problems in certain districts, the Chief Justice of the United States
4. S. Rep. No. 454 at 3.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Act of April 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, § 1, 82 Stat. 109 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(Supp. V, 1970)).
8. Hearings on S. 915 & H.R. 6111 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 322, 326 (1967) ; H.R.
Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1889, 1898-1900 (1968).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 292(b) (1964).
10. 302 F. Supp. 244, 246 n.1 (JPML 1969).
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could designate a district judge in one circuit to serve in another circuit
if he or the chief judge of the circuit filed a certificate of necessity.11
Neither of these procedures, however, provided an effective method of
administering multidistrict litigation.
B. Sections 1404 and 1406
Under certain circumstances it is possible to combine cases brought in
different districts by transferring them to a single district and assigning
them to a single judge. Under section 1406, if an action is commenced in
a district where venue was improper, it can be transferred "to any district
...in which it could have been brought."12 More important, section
1404 provides that, even if a case is properly commenced in one district,
it can be transferred "to any other district or division where it might have
been brought" if the district court where the action is pending finds that
such transfer will be "[f] or the convenience of the parties and witnesses,
[and] in the interest of justice . . . ."" A case transferred pursuant to
either section is transferred for all purposes. 4
In a case involving alternative jurisdictions in which to bring suit, the
choice of forum involves careful analysis by the parties of factors such
as the substantive law of the possible forums,"5 the choice of law con-
siderations involved in selecting the governing law, the quality of the
judges, jurors and opposing counsel, the status of court dockets, the
expense of having to litigate in a distant forum, and the need to have
local counsel and how that affects control of the case. Deciding where to
sue may be the most critical decision in the entire case and it is an estab-
lished principle that the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be disturbed
lightly.1 For that reason, counsel often vigorously oppose any efforts to
11. 28 U.S.C. § 292(c) (1964).
12. Id. § 1406(a).
13. Id. § 1404(a).
14. While there are no cases in point, it would seem appropriate and reasonable for a court
which receives a case pursuant to a 1404(a) transfer to return it to the originating district
under section 1404(a) if the relevant factors in determining the "convenience of the parties
and witnesses" change. For example, where a personal injury suit which was transferred to the
site of the accident for the convenience of the liability witnesses has been tried on the issue
of liability, it would seem more "convenient" to the parties and remaining witnesses to retrans-
fer the case to the originating district where the plaintiff and the damage witnesses reside.
15. Even though the Supreme Court in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U. 612 (1964), held
that the transferee court must apply the substantive law that the transferor court would
apply, the forum still may critically affect the case. For example, certain districts have different
attitudes toward discovery problems; in other districts there are differences in admissibility of
evidence and, of course, an Asheville, North Carolina jury may evaluate personal injury and
death claims quite differently than would a New York, Los Angeles, or Chicago jury.
16. North Branch Prods., Inc. v. Fisher, 284 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 36S
U.S. 827 (1961).
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transfer. Since no single judge rules on all 1404 transfer motions it is
possible that the results will not be consistent. Some cases arising out of
the same facts may not be transferred and, even if transfers are ordered,
the cases may not be sent to the same district.
It was made apparent by the Electrical Equipment Cases that, because
of these deficiencies, the existing statutes did not provide a consistently
reliable method of administering massive multidistrict litigation.
III. THE OPERATION OF SECTION 1407
Section 1407 is a limited purpose statute which provides a means of
transferring all factually related cases to a single district for pretrial
proceedings only." To this end it created a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation composed of seven federal circuit and district court judges ap-
pointed by the Chief Justice of the United States, with the restriction
that no two judges may be from the same circuit.' 8 The Panel was given
the power to transfer, on its own initiative or on motion by one of the
parties, any civil actions which are pending in different districts and in-
volve "one or more common questions of fact ... to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings [if it] .. .will be for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and
efficient conduct of such actions."' 9
The greater flexibility in transferring cases under section 1407 rather
than under section 1404 is obvious. In addition to establishing different
and more liberal standards for transfer, section 1407 makes available a
broader geographical area for transfer. Whereas section 1404 permitted
a transfer only to a district "where it might have been brought,"20 sec-
tion 1407 provides that a transfer may be "to any district."2' Further-
more, section 1407 does not even require that there be an action pending
in the transferee district or that such district have any relationship to the
litigation. While the Panel recognizes its apparent power to transfer to a
disinterested district, it has not as yet done so.
The major difference between these two transfer provisions is the
limited nature of a 1407 transfer. A 1404 transfer is a transfer for all
purposes,22 theoretically to the court best suited to try the case, whereas
17. Thus leaving to the parties the choice of forum for the trial. See S. Rep. No. 454 at 5.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
19. Id. § 1407(a). There is no mention of a requirement of common questions of law.
20. Id. § 1404(a) (1964).
21. Id. § 1407(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
22. However, there has been one recent attempt to affect a limited transfer for liability
only under section 1404(a). Judge Bownes of the District of New Hampshire ordered that all
cases assigned to him pursuant to section 1407 for pretrial proceedings be transferred to the
District of New Hampshire under section 1404(a) "for trial on the issue of liability alone."
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., No. 43, at 3 (D.N.H., June 3, 1971). The
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a transfer under section 1407 is limited to pretrial proceedings only. 3
At the conclusion of the consolidated pretrial proceedings, the case must
be remanded "to the district from which it was transferred."24 As stated
in the Senate Judiciary Report:
The bill does not, therefore, include the trial of cases in the consolidated proceed-
ings.... Additionally, trial in the originating district is generally preferable from the
standpoint of the parties and witnesses, and from the standpoint of the courts it
would be impracticable to have all cases in mass litigation tried in one district. Finally,
the committee recognizes that in most cases there will be a need for local discovery
proceedings to supplement coordinated discovery proceedings, and that consequently
remand to the originating district for this purpose wiU be desirable.2
If a transfer is made, the Panel is authorized to assign the consolidated
cases to a particular judge who is empowered to act in any district."
Where possible, a judge of the transferee district will be designated to
handle the litigation if the chief judge of the district consents and a will-
ing judge can be found. Frequently, however, the Panel will, with the
approval of the chief judge of the transferee district, designate a judge
from another district to handle the litigation. For example, in In re San
Juan, Puerto Rico Air Crash Disaster,27 the Panel transferred the cases
to the District of Puerto Rico but designated Judge Weinfeld of the
Southern District of New York to serve there when the two local judges
disqualified themselves due to a possible conflict of interest. Similarly,
the Panel has recently separated the cases in In re Antibiotic Drugs28
into two classifications, assigning one group of cases to Judge Lord of the
opinion contains no reported authority on the precise issue, and the author has been advised
that petitions for review will be filed.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
24. Id.
25. S. Rep. No. 454 at 5.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (Supp. V, 1970). Because of the importance of early identification
of cases for a section 1407 transfer, the Panel has recommended, and most district courts have
adopted, procedures to enable the Panel to promptly identify cases for section 1407 treatment.
When such a case is identified, the Panel issues an order to show cause why the cases should
not be transferred. The parties may file affidavits and briefs, and a hearing may be held.
The Panel, as authorized by section 1407(e), has issued for the conduct of its business
Rules of Procedure which deal with filing requirements, time for motions, size of paper, date
and place of hearings, and related matters. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. U 9400 (Sept. 1, 1971). The Rules and the Manual
for Complex and Mlultidistrict Litigation, prepared by the Coordinating Committee, should
be studied by anyone involved in multidistrict litigation. The manual has been published by
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. and West Publishing Co. It also appears in 1 J. Moore,
Federal Practice pt. 2 (2d ed. 1970).
27. 316 F. Supp. 981 (JPML 1970). See also In re Brown Co. Sec. Litigation, 325 F. Supp.
307 (JPML 1971); In re Seeburg-Comnonwealth United Merger, 312 F. Supp. 909 (JPMIL
1970).
28. 320 F. Supp. 586 (JPML 1970).
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District of Minnesota, who was designated to sit in the transferee South-
ern District of New York. Thus, as a result of the flexibility achieved
under section 1407, the Panel has been able to utilize available judicial
manpower more efficiently.
Under section 1407 there is a very limited right of review. No appeal is
permitted if the Panel denies transfer.29 However, there may be an appeal
to the court of appeals of the transferee district from the Panel's order
of transfer or an order subsequent to transfer." To date, no order of the
Panel has been appealed.
IV. PREREQUISITES TO TRANSFER
According to section 1407, a case may be transferred if there are com-
mon issues of fact and the Panel finds that transfer will further the "con-
venience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient
conduct" of the action.31 This standard has been criticized as being too
vague and broad; 2 indeed, the Panel has frequently transferred cases
where it did not appear that the standards had been metY3 The statute
does not require that the "common issues of fact" predominate or even
that they be significant to the litigation. For this reason, some cases with
only limited commonality have been subjected to transfer.3 4 Moreover,
while the statute requires that all criteria be met-common questions of
fact, convenience of witnesses and parties, and the promotion of just and
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (Supp. V, 1970).
30. Id. A review by the court of appeals may be obtained only by extraordinary writ pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. V, 1970). Between April 29, 1969 and March 31, 1971,
the Panel denied transfer in only 15 of the 58 matters (dockets) ruled on. Between April 29,
1969 and October 31, 1970, 67 matters were docketed. They may be categorized as follows:
Antitrust-20; Aviation-15; Patent and Trademarks-l; Securities--7; Torts-2; Labor-
2; Product Liability-I; Bankruptcy-I; all others-8. By transfer orders entered prior to
December 31, 1970, the Panel transferred 869 cases to 29 separate transferee judges who, In
addition, were administering 509 cases which were already pending in the transferee district.
The Panel had entered orders in 16 additional dockets between December 31, 1970 and March
31, 1971, but figures as to the number of cases transferred are not yet available. Report of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (Oct. 1970).
32. See, e.g., Committee on Federal Legislation of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York, Proposed Legislation for the Transfer of Multiple Suits to a Single District for Pretrial
Proceedings, 6 Reports of Committees of the Ass'n of the Bar Concerned with Federal Legis-
lation 61, 64-65 (1967).
33. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster At the Greater Cincinnati Airport, 298 F. Supp. 353
(JPML 1968) (transfer of defendant General Dynamics Corporation). See also dissenting
opinions of Judge Weigel in Embro Patent Infringement Litigation, No. 57 (JPML, March 5,
1971); In re Willingham Patent Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1019 (JPML 1971); In re Carrom
Trademark Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1016 (JPML 1971).
34. See, e.g., In re Willingham Patent Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1019 (JPML 1971). See
also In re Air Fare Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1013 (JPML 1971) ; In re Fourth Class Postage
Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326 (JPML 1969).
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efficient conduct of the cases-the Panel has transferred where it found
that only the "just and efficient" criterion was met, often with little re-
gard given to the convenience of the parties. 5 The Panel has assumed
that transfer and consolidation will promote judicial efficiency which will
result in convenience to the parties and witnesses. However, actual expe-
rience in many cases transferred under section 1407 raises serious doubts
as to the validity of this assumption.
Thus, only by an examination of the cases transferred is one able to
fully comprehend the factors considered to be determinative by the Panel.
According to Judge Weigel:3  "The basic question before the Panel in
each proceeding looking to coordinated or consolidated pretrial is, then,
whether the objectives of the statute are sufficiently served to justify the
necessary inconveniences of transfer and remand. 37 He went on to point
out that many factors are relevant in determining whether transfer is
dictated in a particular case, and that the importance of each factor may
vary from case to case.38
A. Common Questions of Fact
The Panel has held that, in order to obtain a transfer, the initial pre-
requisite is the existence of one or more common questions of fact."' In
some types of cases, such as aviation accident, security fraud, and patent
infringement litigation, the common questions of fact are significant and
obvious. It is often not clear whether the common issues of fact found by
the Panel are so important or significant to the litigation as to justify
disruptive transfer. However, the Panel is quick to find that there are
common facts sufficient to order transfer, despite the frequent dissent of
Judge Weigel who recently stated: "As in [two recent cases40], it seems
to me that there are insufficient common questions of fact to justify [a
section] 1407 transfer in the light of the troubles and inconveniences oc-
casioned thereby."41
Although the existence of common questions of law is not a ground
35. See, e.g., In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, No. 29 (JPMiL, Feb. 2, 1970) ; In re
Concrete Pipe Litigation, 303 F. Supp. 507 (JPML 1969); In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F.
Supp. 1402 (JPML 1968).
36. Judge of the Northern District of California and member of the Panel.
37. In re Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 244, 255 (JPMAL 1969). Judge Weigel's opinion con-
tains the most detailed and explicit listing of factors which may be deemed significant by the
Panel in deciding whether to transfer.
38. Id.
39. E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster At the Greater Cincinnati Airport, 298 F. Supp. 353,
354 (JPML 1968).
40. In re Willingham Patent Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1019 (JPMI, 1971); In re Carrom
Trademark Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1016 (JP IL 1971).
41. In re Embro Patent Infringement Litigation, No. 57, at 6 (JPAIL, March 5, 1971)
(dissenting opinion).
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for a 1407 transfer, the Panel has transferred cases where the common
legal question was the prime issue. Where it has done this, it has rational-
ized its decision by saying that it was necessary to discover the under-
lying or surrounding facts. Thus, in In re Fourth Class Postage Regula-
tionsI the Panel chose to consider as relevant factors justifying transfer
such "common facts" as the historical development of postal sorting, the
presence or absence of studies supporting the legislation, and the public
policy implications of applying the regulations to certain materials. More
recently, this issue was raised in In re Air Fare Litigation3 which in-
volved seven class action claims for the refund of fare overcharges. The
Panel found that, although the primary issue was a question of law, there
were common fact questions concerning the total damages to the class.
Hence, the cases suggest that if the Panel feels the matter should be
consolidated under section 1407, common questions of fact will be found
to exist in order to justify the transfer.
While the statute applies if there are cases pending in at least two
different districts," it was originally held that, where only a few cases
were involved, transfer would be ordered only upon a showing that the
common questions of fact were rather complex. Accordingly, transfer was
denied in In re Scotch Whiskey,4" where two cases were pending in two
districts. On the other hand, transfers were ordered in In re IBM,40
where four cases were pending in only two districts, since the Panel found
that the cases were exceptional and involved "complex questions of fact."" 7
More recently, however, the Panel has ordered transfers where four cases
were pending in three districts,48 and where three cases were pending in
two districts,49 even though in both cases "the factual complexity [was]
not so great as In re IBM Antitrust Litigation. . . ."50 Furthermore, the
Panel has even gone to the extreme, in In re CBS Licensing Antitrust
Litigation,r' of ordering transfer where only two cases were pending in
two districts, apparently feeling that judicial efficiency would be enhanced
since in one of the cases the judge had already dismissed several causes
of action. Thus, it is suggested by these cases that the Panel is abandon-
ing its initially expressed reluctance against ordering transfer where only
a few cases are involved.
42. 298 F. Supp. 1326 (JPML 1969).
43. 322 F. Supp. 1013 (JPML 1971).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
45. 299 F. Supp. 543 (JPML 1969).
46. 302 F. Supp. 796 (JPML 1969).
47. Id. at 799.
48. In re Carrom Trademark Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1016 (JPML 1971).
49. In re WiUingham Patent Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1019 (JPML 1971).
50. Id. at 1020.
51. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1971 Trade Cas.) ff 73,447 (JPML, Jan. 20, 1971).
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B. Just and Efficient Proceedings
The cases discussed immediately above52 are a further indication
that the statutory requirement that judicial efficiency result from transfer
plays the greatest role in the Panel's consideration of transfer motions.
Indeed, when section 1407 was originally proposed the Coordinating
Committee on Multiple Litigation said that this requirement "limits the
applicability of the proposed statute to litigation in which significant
economy and efficiency in judicial administration may be obtained. 3a
However, in order to prevent the total sacrifice of the interests of the
parties in achieving the goal of judicial efficiency, section 1407 provides
that the transfer must result in "just" as well as "efficient" conduct of
the actions.'
The Panel is apparently of the view that transfer and coordination in-
variably mean overall economy and efficiency and will avoid conflicting
pretrial rulings,5 5 duplication of discovery 0 and multiplicity of appeals."'
The Panel has effectively used section 1407 to consolidate and administer
massive civil antitrust cases which have been filed with increasing fre-
quency. Had it not transferred and consolidated these cases there would
have been serious inefficiency, the possibility of inconsistent and con-
flicting results, and an adverse impact on the entire judicial structure.
However, aside from antitrust cases, the Panel's view that efficiency and
economy always follow a transfer is subject to serious doubt as a result
of the experience of handling aviation disaster litigation.
Prior to the enactment of section 1407, cases arising out of commercial
aviation accidents were frequently brought in many different districts.
They were generally handled efficiently and quickly, and in very few
instances was it necessary to have more than one case tried as a result of
any one accident0 8 Discovery frequently was completed within two years
52. Cases discussed at notes 48, 49 & 51 supra and accompanying text.
53. In re Plumbing Fixtures Cases, 298 F. Supp. 483, 499 (JPML 1968).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. V, 1970) ; see The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
795.
55. In re Fourth Class Postage Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326 (JPML 1969).
56. In re Gypsum Wallboard, 297 F. Supp. 1350 (JPML 1969). The Panel has ordered
transfer to avoid duplication of discovery despite a history of voluntary cooperation among
counsel. E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio, 310 F. Supp. 798 (JPML 1970).
57. Where discovery has reached an advanced stage, transfer offers little advantage.
Transfer was denied in In re Grain Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402 (JPML 1969), and In re
Air Crash Disaster At Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323 (JPML 1969), where two cases
well along in discovery proceedings were not transferred and consolidated with thirty other
cases. But see In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 315 F. Supp. 317 (JPML 1970).
58. The most notable exception was the litigation arising out of the crash of an Eastern
Air Lines Electra at Logan Airport, Massachusetts, in October 1960. Cases against five de-
fendants were brought primarily in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Because of the Massa-
chusetts wrongful death limitations, the Pennsylvania plaintiffs opposed a motion to transfer
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of the date of the accident, fully prepared cases seldom required more
than 3,000 pages of depositions, and defendants' employees were rarely
examined more than once regardless of the number of cases pending or
the number of different districts involved. In contrast, efficiency and
economy have been the exception rather than the rule in aviation cases
transferred and consolidated by the Panel under section 140 7 .11 For ex-
ample, in the litigation arising out of the two air crashes at the Cincinnati
Airport in 1965° and 1967,61 the commencement of depositions was de-
layed more than two years and were not concluded until long after most
of the cases which were started contemporaneously in the state courts
had been resolved. In the consolidated litigation arising out of the Pied-
mont air collision in July 1967, near Hendersonville, North Carolina,"s
depositions ran for well over one year with the taking of more than
15,000 pages of testimony. Far from fostering economy and efficiency,
consolidation has caused delay, expense and injustice. When all the cases
are consolidated and all the parties are gathered together, individual
settlements become rare because of the fear that, in the fishbowl atmo-
sphere which usually prevails, the terms will become general knowledge
and set a pattern. Moreover, all settlements are delayed for excessive
periods of time while a "package" settlement is devised.
C. Convenience of Parties and Witnesses
The final statutory prerequisite is that the transfer must be for the con-
venience of the parties and the witnesses.' Judge Weigel has recognized
that "there are a number of inherent inconveniences" in 1407 transfers
and has characterized some of them as follows:
Some plaintiffs are temporarily deprived of their choices of forum and some de-
fendants may be forced to litigate in districts where they could not have been sued.
Considerable time and trouble are involved in the sheer mechanics of transferring and
remanding. After transfer, the process of segregating the pretrial matters which
should be remanded for handling by the transferor courts may be time-consuming as
well as subject to reasonable disagreement. Since remand must be by order of the
Panel, the -Panel may have to hold further hearings to resolve disagreements among
the parties."
the cases to Massachusetts and that issue finally had to be resolved by the Supreme Court In
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). See note 15 supra.
59. Except for In re Air Crash Disaster At Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323 (JPML
1969), which involved cases which were at an advanced stage in the proceedings at the time
the matter was considered by it, the Panel has transferred and consolidated every commercial
aircraft disaster case which has been brought before it.
60. In re Air Crash Disaster At the Greater Cincinnati Airport, 295 F. Supp. 51 (JPML
1968).
61. In re Air Crash Disaster At the Greater Cincinnati Airport, 298 F. Supp. 353 (JPML
1968).
62. In re Mid-Air Collision Near Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039 (JPML 1969).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp.V, 1970).
64. In re Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 244, 254-55 (JPML 1969) (footnote omitted).
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Despite the expressed "inherent inconveniences," the Panel has as-
sumed that coordination will, nevertheless, further the convenience of
most of the parties. It has generally rejected claims of inconvenience
made by the parties as being "parochial" and "self-interested.'O6 When
counsel have claimed that transfer to distant forums will create great
inconvenience and impose unjustifiable financial expenses of transporta-
tion, of retaining local counsel, and of out of town living, the Panel has
stated: "We are satisfied that any additional burden will be offset by the
savings from and convenience of coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings directed by the transferee judge." 600
Similarly, in In re Butterfield Patent Infringement,7 the Panel said:
"[I] t is not only expedient, but less expensive for each individual defendant
to join in the selection of lead counsel to handle the consolidated dis-
covery depositions.""e In response to counsels' argument that they will
lose control of their cases, the Panel has said that their fears are irrel-
evant since they can rely on other counsel and "receive the benefit of the
consolidated depositions without the necessity of engaging individual local
counsel in the transferee court and without the necessity of extensive
travel by their own local counsel."' ' One effect of the Panel's approach,
innocent and well motivated as it may be, is to force some lawyers into a
position where they must accept the benefit of another lawyer's work
whether they want to or not. Conversely, certain lawyers are compelled to
provide their work product for the benefit of other lawyers without com-
pensation. As a result, the interest and convenience of the parties may
well be sacrificed for an assumed, but unproven, judicial convenience and
economy.
On the other hand, the Panel has acted promptly and with ample
justification in consolidating cases which involved competing class action
claims.70 As stated in the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litiga-
tion:71 "If two courts enter parallel orders determining that an action in
each court shall proceed as a class action for all plaintiffs similarly situ-
ated, without regard to geographical areas or district boundaries, a real
65. See, e.g., In re IBM, 302 F. Supp. 796 (JPMI, 1969).
66. In re Concrete Pipe, 303 F. Supp. 507, 509 (JPML 1969); accord, In re Antibiotic
Drugs, 295 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (JPML 1968).
67. No. 29 (JPML, Feb. 2, 1970).
68. Id. at 3.
69. Id. The Panel has also rejected the suggestion that it should establish in national cams
two or more regional transferee courts in order to ease the burden on small parties. The Panel
has always selected a single transferee court despite the probable savings to the parties. In re
Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F. Supp. 1402 (JPML 1968).
70. E.g., In re Antibiotic Drugs, 303 F. Supp. 1056 (JPML 1969) ; In re Plumbing Fixture
Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (JPML 1968); In re Protection Devices & Equip., 295 F. Supp. 39
(JPML 1968).
71. 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice pt. 2 (2d ed. 1970). See note 26 supra.
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conflict between the courts exists."7 2 Thus, if the Panel had not acted to
consolidate them, competing class actions could proceed independently
in the different districts with the very real possibility of chaos and con-
fusion. 7
3
An analysis of the Panel's decisions indicates that it is quick to find
common issues of fact and prone to transfer cases where there are some
common issues, often with little regard to the significance of them to the
litigation. An analysis also reveals that the Panel has assumed, despite
practical experience demonstrating that consolidation has a deleterious
effect in certain cases, that coordination will lead to efficiency and
economy and result in greater convenience to the majority of the litigants,
without giving serious consideration to the claims of inconvenience, cost
and prejudice frequently asserted.
V. Timm OF TR NSFER
There has been considerable discussion 74 concerning the appropriate
time to transfer cases which are subject to section 1407. The timing of
transfer may have a significant effect on the entire course of the litiga-
tion; it may affect not only which court will rule on early motions, but it
may also affect the method and exercise of control of the litigation by
the parties. The Panel has asserted that early consolidation furthers sec-
tion 1407's goals of centralized pretrial management which includes the
"reduction of court congestion, conservation of judicial energy, saving
of time and trouble for parties and witnesses, resolution of conflicting
discovery demands, acceleration of solutions of major controversies, and
fostering sound results on the merits."7 Given this belief it is only natural
that the Panel would attempt to identify possible section 1407 cases and
effect early transfers, preferably before any significant independent dis-
covery has been conducted. To this end the Panel has taken steps,70 in
cooperation with the various district courts and the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, to identify "appropriate" cases and has con-
sistently rejected attempts to delay transfers.
72. 1 j. Moore, supra note 71, at § 5.5, at 99.
73. The Panel has said that "[it is in the field of class action determinations in related
multidistrict civil actions that the potential for conflicting, disorderly, chaotic judicial action
is the greatest." In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 493 (JPML 1968).
74. E.g., In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385 (JPML 1968).
75. In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (JPML 1969).
However, the Panel has also made it clear that discovery proceedings commenced in tho
transferee district are not stayed unless modified by the transferee judge after the initial pre-
trial conference. In re Master Key, 320 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (JPML 1971).
76. See 1 J. Moore, supra note 71, at §§ 02-.23, at 9-10.
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In In re Library Editions of Children's Books,77 and In re Gypsum
Wallboard,78 the Panel ordered transfer even though the defendants had
not been served with process. Moreover, in the former case, transfer was
ordered notwithstanding the fact that the defendants did not have notice
of the proposed transfer. Rejecting counsel's argument that failure to
give an unserved defendant notice of the proposed transfer prevents the
transfer, the Panel stated that cases had been transferred under section
1404"o and section 14060 even though defendants had not been served,
and that "lack of personal jurisdiction over a defendant does not neces-
sarily bar a transfer as a matter of constitutional law." 8' It pointed out
that the defendants still had to be served "pursuant to the rules of the
transferor court" and that they could raise any motions, such as motions
to quash or dismiss for want of jurisdiction. - Furthermore, while section
1407 required the Panel to give notice to "parties," the Panel defined
"parties" so as to exclude anyone who had not as yet been served. Finally,
the Panel justified its decision by stating that the effectiveness of 1407
"would be severely impeded" if the power to transfer was contingent
upon all named parties being served. 3
One problem resulting from early transfer is the effect of transfer on
motions which have been made in the originating court and which are
sub judice at the time the question of transfer is before the Panel. It is
generally assumed that transfer divests the transferor court of jurisdic-
tion. 4 Assuming this is so, some have argued that the Panel should defer
action until all pending motions have been resolved. In In re Plumbing
77. 299 F. Supp. 1139 (JPML 1969).
78. 302 F. Supp. 794 (JPML 1969).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
80. Id. § 1406(a).
81. 299 F. Supp. at 1141.
82. Id. at 1142. The Panel specifically did not pass upon "the question of whether such
motions should be raised in the transferor or the transferee court." Id. n1. However, by the
time of its decision in In re Gypsum Wallboard, 302 F. Supp. 794 (JPML 1969), only three
and one half months later, the Panel said that such motions were "being routinely considered
by courts to which multidistrict litigation has previously been transferred" and suggested that
the defendant could pursue its remedy there. Id. On September 1, 1971, the Panel's newly
adopted rules became effective. Rule 12(f) provides that the failure to serve the complaint
or a copy of the transfer order on the defendant did not preclude transfer or render the
transfer void although the absence of such service would constitute a basis for opposing trans-
fer or seeking remand. In effect, the Panel has codified its decisions in In re Library Editions
of Children's Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139 (JPML 1969), and In re Gypsum Wallboard, supra,
by promulgation of this rule.
83. 299 F. Supp. at 1142.
84. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (JPML 1968).
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Fixture Cases,85 one of the parties urged that the Panel delay action
until it could obtain a ruling on a motion for a class action determination.
The Panel rejected the plea for delay and took the opportunity to restate
its inclination for early transfers and to make clear that it would give
due regard to the rights of the transferor court. Recognizing that transfer
motions might come before it while important motions, possibly involving
summary judgment or dismissal of claims, were pending in the transferor
court, the Panel stated:
On principles of comity, where appropriate, the Panel has in the past timed its actions
and constructed its orders in a manner which will permit the transferor courts (and
Courts of Appeals if any are involved) to reach timely decisions on particular issues
without abrupt, disconcerting, untimely or inappropriate orders of transfer by the
Panel. This policy of comity has been followed in the past and will be followed in the
future by the Panel.86
This flexible approach has led the Panel to transfer cases pending in
one district despite the fact that a 1404 transfer motion was sub judice
before the district judge while, in the same case, denying transfer of cases
pending in another district where the plaintiffs intended to seek appellate
review of a decision ordering a 1404 transfer.8" It was the Panel's opinion
that transfer of the cases to be appealed would disrupt the proceeding in
process, whereas transfer of the undecided motion could easily be de-
ferred.88
The problem of divestiture of jurisdiction over pending motions could
have been a source of dissension between the Panel and the district judges
who had motions pending before them. While the Panel assumes that its
transfer order divests the transferor court of all jurisdiction, there are no
cases yet decided, other than by the Panel itself, which support the asser-
tion that a judge can be divested of jurisdiction over a motion submitted
to him. Moreover, at least one member of the Panel, Judge Weinfeld,""
has asserted that there is no such divestiture of jurisdiction.t0 However,
both the Panel and the district judges have approached the matter in a
85. 298 F. Supp. 484 (JPML 1968).
86. Id. at 496. This case is also significant because the Panel rejected the idea that it could
partition issues in a single claim for relief and assign certain portions to one court and other
portions to another court. The Panel reviewed the legislative history and ruled that a claim for
relief is "unitary" and an irreducible unit. While such a claim can be transferred, it cannot be
divided, and two courts cannot exercise "contemporaneous dual control" over a single claim
for relief. Id. at 495.
87. In re Mid-Air Collision Near Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039 (JPML 1969).
88. Id. Contra, In re Deering Miiken Patent Litigation, No. 49 (JPML, Aug. 21, 1970),
where the Panel denied transfer in order to give the originating courts an opportunity to rule
on pending motions.
89. Judge of the Southern District of New York.
90. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 497 (JPML 1968) (dissenting opinion).
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spirit of comity and reasonableness, with the courts following Judge
Weinfeld's advice to "decline to exercise jurisdiction and defer to the
transferee court."91
While the Panel's policy of early transfer is sound, it does raise certain
problems, the primary one being the "tag along" case. As defined in the
Panel's Rules of Procedure,92 the "tag along" case is "a civil action ap-
parently sharing common questions of fact with actions previously trans-
ferred under Section 1407 and which was filed or came to the attention of
the Panel after the initial hearing before it."93 The magnitude of the
"tag along" problem is highlighted by the fact that nearly two-thirds of
the 502 cases transferred by the Panel between July 1, 1969 and June
30, 1970, were "tag along" cases.
94
The first problem the "tag along" faces is that if he is opposed to trans-
fer or has reason to desire transfer to a particular district, his arguments
may not be heard by the Panel at the initial hearing and he is then con-
fronted with a fait accompli. 95 Although the Panel has set up a procedure
which gives a "tag along" the right to be heard," his voice is given little
weight since the Panel has already acted. Indeed, even though in several
rare instances97 the Panel has refused to transfer a "tag along," many
parties who oppose transfer simply do not object because of the apparent
futility of achieving any success.
91. Id.
92. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on fultidistrict Litigation, 2 Trade Reg.
Rep. fI 9400 (Sept. 1, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Panel RI].
93. Panel R. 1, at 15,767.
94. Reports of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (March & Oct. 1970).
95. There has been at least one case where prospective plaintiffs have sought leave to appear
at a hearing on transfer of the matter in which the plaintiffs were involved, but where the
actions had not yet been commenced. In re Mid-Air Collision Near Fairland, Ind., 309 F.
Supp. 621 (JPML 1970). The Panel denied the prospective party the right to appear or file
papers without giving any reason for the refusal. Letter from John T. McDermott, Adminis-
trative Attorney, JPML, to Stanley J. Levy, Esq., Jan. 8, 1970.
96. When the clerk of the Panel learns of the existence of a "tag along" case he enters a
transfer order pursuant to Panel R. 12(a). However, the clerk withholds transmitting the
transfer order to the clerk of the transferee court, thus staying execution for fifteen days
to give the parties a chance to file a "Notice of Opposition." Id. The "conditional trans-
fer order" is an administrative device to expedite transfer where there is no opposition;
it is not a decision by the Panel which must be reversed to be vacated. In re Grain Ship-
ments, 319 F. Supp. 533, 534 (JPML 1970). When the clerk receives the notice of opposition
he further extends the stay until the Panel acts. The party opposing must file a motion with
supporting brief to vacate the transfer order within fifteen days of the filing of the notice
of opposition, and must notify the Panel if a hearing is requested. Failure to file is deemed
a withdrawal of opposition. Panel R. 12 (c), at 15,769-70.
97. In re Western Liquid Asphalt, 309 F. Supp. 157 (JPMIL 1970); In re Concrete Pipe,
297 F. Supp. 1125 (JPM1 1968).
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When the "tag along" plaintiff reaches the transferee court his presence
may cause problems for him, for the cases already pending there, and for
the court. Discovery may already have begun and he may find himself at
a substantial disadvantage in the proceedings. On the other hand, to
assure that his rights are not prejudiced and to minimize any request for
supplemental discovery, the court will probably insist that he be given
full access to and the benefit of the production and depositions already
conducted. Frequently, this is done without the court also insisting that
he bear a fair share of the expenses already incurred. Additionally, he
may find that agreements and stipulations have been reached which he
is not permitted to challenge. More significantly, he may find that matters
of importance to him, such as determination of class action questions,
selection of lead counsel, summary judgment motions and the like, have
already been litigated and decided, and are binding on him even though
he did not participate in those proceedings. However, to enjoin discovery
in order to assure that all possible cases have been commenced and con-
solidated would be unfair to the diligent plaintiff.
There is no easy solution to the problem. If the consolidated discovery
has substantially progressed it would be a reasonable ground for denying
transfer.98 Perhaps the only feasible approach is to leave it to the trans-
feree court's discretion to minimize any injustice or prejudice. To this end
the transferee court has substantial latitude. 9
VI. SELECTION OF THE TRANSFmmE FORUM
After the Panel has decided to transfer a matter it must select the
transferee forum. Obviously the parties are vitally interested in this de-
cision and the Panel's rulings indicate that the choice of the appropriate
forum is more frequently argued than whether the case should be trans-
ferred.
Section 1407 offers no guidance. It simply states that the Panel may
transfer "to any district" for pretrial proceedings. 100 While the Panel has
asserted power to transfer the cases to a district in which there are no
cases pending and no interest in the litigation, it has generally gone
through a balancing procedure in selecting an appropriate forum for the
pretrial proceedings. The ideal transferee court, according to the Panel,
would be a district where many of the common facts occurred, where a
number of the cases are already pending, where some discovery has taken
place, where a single judge is already familiar with the litigation, and
98. In re Air Crash Disaster At Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323 (JPML 1969).
99. In re Concrete Pipe, 303 F. Supp. 507 (JPML 1969).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. V, 1970). Although the statute itself provides no guid-
ance, its legislative history states that several factors such as the state of the transferee district's
docket, the availability of counsel, and sufficient courtroom facilities, should be considered. S.
Rep. No. 454 at 5.
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where the judges and the court are not burdened by calendar problems." 1
Unfortunately, however, the ideal is rarely obtained; therefore, the
Panel must select between competing considerations. Certain adminis-
trative factors considered are: Whether or not there is a judge in the
suggested transferee district who is familiar with the case; whether or
not he is willing to accept responsibility for the litigation; whether or not
his workload is such as will permit him to handle the case, and if not,
whether or not a judge from another district can be assigned; 102 and,
whether or not the chief judge of the district will consent to the transfer
of additional cases into his district. Unless all of these questions are an-
swered affirmatively the suggested court may not be "appropriate." More-
over, the Panel will frequently examine the relative condition of calendars
in competing districts.
1 0 3
The Panel gives some consideration to which district has the most
cases already pending, but this is not the single determinative factor."'
It gives great weight to decisions transferring related cases to a particular
district under section 1404.111 In cases which are national in scope the
101. See In re IBM, 302 F. Supp. 796 (JPML 1969); In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 295
F. Supp. 33 (JPML 1968).
102. The Panel has been quite willing to transfer a case to the district which seemed most
appropriate and then assign an out of district judge to handle it. In re Alsco-Harvard Fraud
Litigation, 325 F. Supp. 315 (JPML 1971); In re Brown Co. Sec. Litigation, 325 F. Supp.
307 (JPML 1971) ; In re Antibiotic Drugs, 320 F. Supp. 586 (JPML 1970).
103. E.g., In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 387 (JPML
1968). It is likely that calendar congestion may be a greater factor than the opinions suggest.
The Panel, in its reports, has noted that most commercial cases have been tranferred to urban
districts such as the Southern District of New York (3 cases), the Central (3 cases) and
Northern District of California (5 cases), and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (2 cases).
These districts have not been deluged by the cases transferred under section 1407 only because
the tort cases have generally been transferred to more rural districts. Thus, the Southern
District of New York has had a net loss of 17 cases, the Northern District of California has
had a loss of 32 cases, and the Central District of California has had a loss of 13 cases. Only
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which was the transferee court for In re Plumbing Fix-
ture Cases and In re Concrete Pipe has shown a substantial gain of 268 cases. Report of the
judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, App. B (Oct. 1970).
104. In re Koratron, 302 F. Supp. 239 (JPML 1969); In re Gypsum Wallboard, 297
F. Supp. 1350 (JPML 1969); In re Protection Devices & Equip, 295 F. Supp. 39 (JPML
1968). But see In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, No. 29 (JPML, Feb. 2, 1970) (the
Panel transferred the cases to the Northern District of Illinois where four cases were pending,
despite plantiffs' request to transfer either to New York where eleven cases were pending, or
to San Francisco where nine cases were pending); In re IBM, 302 F. Supp. 796 (JPML 1969)
(the Panel transferred the cases to the District of Minnesota where only one case was pend-
ing). It is also dear that neither the plaintiffs' nor the defendants' choice of forum is accorded
much weight. In re Butterfield Patent Infringement, supra; In re Library Editions of Chl-
dren's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385 (JPML 1968).
105. In re Master Key, 320 F. Supp. 1404 (JPML 1971); In re Frost Patent, 316 F. Supp.
977 (JPML 1970); In re Mid-Air Collision Near Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039
(JPM, 1969).
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Panel tries to minimize the expense and inconvenience to the parties by
selecting a centrally located district, even if it is not one proposed by
them.'
Often the type of case will be a determinative factor. For example,
bankruptcy cases are generally transferred to the district where the
bankruptcy is pending,'10 7 and antitrust cases are frequently transferred
to the district where the government's case is pending.' Aviation cases,
with one exception, have been transferred to the district which was the
fortuitous site of the accident,1 9 without any real consideration given to
the particular facts involved. Thus, all of the cases arising out of the
mid-air collision of a Piedmont airplane and a private plane near Hen-
dersonville, North Carolina, were transferred to the Western District of
North Carolina even though all of the attorneys participating in the liti-
gation were from distant states and all but a few minor witnesses were
from outside the district."0
Except in the area of aviation cases, the Panel has avoided any in-
flexible rule to determine the transferee court. It has wisely enunciated
the factors it considers relevant and has evidenced a careful balancing of
competing considerations in the selection of the transferee forum.
VII. PowERs AFTER TRANSFER
A. In General
It is generally accepted that when a case is transferred by the Panel,
the transferor court ceases to have any jurisdiction over the case until it
is remanded at the completion of pretrial discovery. Section 1407 pro-
vides that when a case is transferred the "coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings shall be conducted by a judge or judges to whom
106. In re Air Fare, 322 F. Supp. 1013 (JPML 1971) ; In re Butterfield Patent Infringe-
ment, No. 29 (JPML, Feb. 2, 1970).
107. In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 322 F. Supp. 1021 (JPML 1971); In re Westec
Corp., 307 F. Supp. 559 (JPML 1969). However, the Panel has rejected assignment of the
case to the judge handling the bankruptcy because of the difficulty involved in managing both,
and because of the possible conflict in duties which may result. In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litiga-
tion, supra, at 1023.
108. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 315 F. Supp. 317 (JPML 1970); In re Motor
Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 311 F. Supp. 1349 (JPML 1970); In re Library Editions
of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385 (JPML 1968).
109. In re Mid-Air Collision Near Fairland, Ind., 309 F. Supp. 621 (JPML 1970); In re
Mid-Air Collision Near Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039 (JPML 1969). The one
exception is In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., No. 64 (JPML, Aug. 25, 1971),
a unique situation which really should not have been subject to section 1407 at all.
110. In re Mid-Air Collision Near Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039 (JPML 1969).
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such actions are assigned ... The Panel has interpreted this lan-
guage to mean that it must transfer the complete claim, that it cannot
separate the various issues reserving some for resolution by the trans-
feror court,-' and that even if it could, such partitioning would be un-
sound. Also, once the case is transferred the transferor court is totally
divested of jurisdiction. In In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, the Panel
said:
[A]fter an order changing venue [a § 1404 transfer] the jurisdiction of the transferor
court ceases; and ... thereafter the transferor court can issue no further orders, and
any steps taken by it are of no effect. These principles are applicable to a transfer
under Section 1407 from the time of entry of the order of transfer until the time of
entry of an order of remand."13
The statute, as drafted, granted the Panel no substantive power. Its
authority was limited to determining the transfer question, designating
judges "when needed" to assist the transferee court in the processing of
the transferred cases," 4 and ultimately remanding the cases "to the dis-
trict from which [they were] transferred."-" However, the Panel has as-
sumed a role far beyond that contemplated by section 1407. As the Panel
itself modestly stated in a recent report: "Although it lacks explicit sta-
tutory authority to supervise discovery, the Panel retains an active in-
terest in and responsibility for insuring that the transferred litigation is
processed efficiently, expeditiously and economically.""' The Panel has
demonstrated its "responsibility" by maintaining a constant and often
direct supervision of cases transferred. Not only has it offered advice to
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (Supp. V, 1970). The Panel's order of transfer is filed in the
clerk's office of the transferee court and is effective when filed. The clerk then sends certified
copies of the Panel's order to the transferor courts. Id. § 1407(c):The entire file is then trans-
ferred to the transferee court. Any appeal from the order of transfer must be taken in the
circuit court having jurisdiction over the transferee district. Id. § 1407(e).
112. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 489-90, 495 (JPAIL 1968). However,
the Panel treats an individual "claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim" separ-
ately on motions to transfer and remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
113. 298 F. Supp. at 496 (citations omitted). As noted previously (see text accompanying
note 90 supra), Judge Weinfeld dissented from that part of the opinion which held that the
transferror court was divested of jurisdiction over a motion which was sub judice, stating:
"However, when a motion under Rule 23 already has been argued or submitted to a judge in
the transferor court and is undetermined by him at the time of the entry of the transfer
order by the Panel under section 1407, such transfer order does not divest the transferor
judge of jurisdiction to make his determination of the Rule 23 motion." 298 F. Supp. at 497.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
115. Id. § 1407(a). To date only one matter transferred pursuant to section 1407 has been
remanded. In re Air Crash Disaster At Hong Kong, No. 15 (JPML, Feb. 11, 1970). A num-
ber have been settled or disposed of while pending in the transferee court.
116. Report of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 5 (Oct 1970).
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transferee judges, but the Panel's staff has, on occasion, been present and
taken part in the consolidated pretrial proceedings. It has required status
reports from the transferee judges concerning the progress of the liti-
gation, and has held conferences for them, offering advice and suggestions
on how to handle the cases. In addition, the Panel has published reports
and bulletins and has used its published opinions to define and, indeed,
expand the authority of the transferee courts. This subtle development
of the Panel's power has led some to dub it a "super-court" despite its
apparent lack of any substantive statutory authority.
However, the real substantive power clearly rests in the transferee
court, although there is some dispute concerning the full extent of that
power. In In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, the Panel made clear its under-
standing that the transferee court's power was coextensive with that of
the transferor court. It stated:
In substance a transfer under Section 1404(a) is a 'change of venue' (that is a
'change of courtrooms') for completion of pretrial and for trial or other disposi-
tion .... By analogy a transfer under Section 1407 is a change of venue for pretrial
purposes.
On change of venue the overwhelming authority holds that the jurisdiction and
powers of the transferee court are coextensive with that of the transferor court; that
the transferee court may make any order to render any judgment that might have been
rendered by the transferor court in the absence of transfer .... These principles are
applicable to a transfer under Section 1407 from the time of entry of the order of
transfer until the time of entry of an order of remand.117
The Panel also made it explicitly clear that the power of the transferee
court is not limited to rulings relating to pretrial discovery. One of the
parties had argued that the transferor court should rule on its class action
motion since the class action determination was not a "pretrial proceed-
ing." Rejecting the claim that the term "pretrial proceeding" as used in
section 1407 was limited to discovery only, the Panel said it included
"all judicial proceedings before trial."11
Gradually, the Panel and the transferee courts have been defining the
extent of the latter's authority. Obviously all normal pretrial discovery
motions must be addressed to the transferee court. But in addition, trans-
feree courts, either by their own action or by pronouncement of the Panel,
have assumed the power to decide motions addressed to the pleadings, 11
challenging venue and jurisdiction, 20 seeking dismissal of third-party
117. 298 F. Supp. at 495-96 (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 493-94.
119. In re CBS Licensing Antitrust Litigation, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1971 Trade Cas.)
9 73,447, at 89,847 (JPML, Jan. 20, 1971).
120. Monkelis v. TWA, 303 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Ky. 1969); In re Gypsum Wallboard, 302
F. Supp. 794 (JPML 1969).
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complaints,' attacking standing to sue,12  seeking remand to the state
courts,2  seeking injunctive relief, 2 4 and seeking summary judgmenLt
Furthermore, transferee courts have assumed the power to control the
settlement.
B. Class Action Determinations
One of the most interesting questions concerning the powers of the
transferee court involves the determination of class action questions. As
noted previously,2 6 the Panel is quick to consolidate class actions to
avoid chaos and confusion. It has also rejected any suggestion that it
delay transfer to permit the transferor court to make class action rulings.
Accordingly, the Panel has stated that:
[I]t is not certain that each district court will always be able to learn of the conflicting
requests made to other courts. It is certain, however, that if these conflicting requests
are determined under Section 1407 in a transferee court, the information and means for
fair, speedy and economical coordinated determinations will exist. It is the clear in-
tent of Section 1407 to invest the transferee court with the exclusive powers, after
transfer, to make the pretrial determinations of the class action questions.2 7
In the opinion of the Panel, class action rulings are "the most urgent of
the pretrial proceedings,"'28 and their determination is properly left to
the transferee court. 29 Furthermore, not only will this advance the
efficient conduct of the litigation at the district court level, but it will also
permit any appellate review to be coordinated in one court of appeals.'
Following the Panel's lead, many transferee courts have established the
121. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Le May, No. 11-1034 (7th Cir., July 2, 1971). The Seventh
Circuit dimissed Allegheny's attempt to appeal from the transferee court's dismisl of the
third-party claim, noting that a determination concerning dismissal of a third-party complaint
was not "a 'pretrial proceeding' as that term is contemplated in §1407." Id. at 5. The court
stated that the district court had refused to authorize an intermediate appeal and held that
the order was not "final." It went on to state that the decision could be reviewed by the
appellate court of the transferor district after the entry of judgment.
122. Id. at 3.
123. In re Antibiotic Drugs, 299 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 n.4 (JPAIL 1969).
124. In re Fourth Class Postage Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326 (JPML 1969).
125. In re Alsco-Harvard Fraud Litigation, 325 F. Supp. 315 (JPML 1971) ; In re Butter-
field Patent Infringement, No. 29 (JPML, Feb. 2, 1970) ; In re Fourth Class Postage Regula-
tions, 298 F. Supp. 1326 (JPML 1969); In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484
(JPML 1968). However, some judges have refused to rule on summary judgment motions.
126. See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text.
127. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 493 (JPML 1968).
128. Id. at 494.
129. In re Protection Devices & Equip., 295 F. Supp. 39, 40 (JPMIL 1968).
130. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484,495 (JPML 1968).
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classes, and proceeded to administer them.181 Moreover, the Panel has
stated that the transferee court "can review and if necessary modify the
orders [which established national class actions and which set forth a
discovery schedule] at any time."'1 32
However, the fact that the transferee court may have the power to
make class action determinations does not resolve all the problems. The
Panel recognizes that most class action orders, including those defining
the class, selecting lead counsel, and establishing notice requirements, are
conditional and "may be altered or amended" at any time before final
decision. Therefore, upon remand the transferor court apparently has the
power to amend the class action rulings and presumably may reinstate
conflicting classes, appoint new lead counsel or take some other action
inconsistent with the decision of the transferee court. To date there is no
indication that this has ever happened and it is not likely that such
action would be taken without substantial justification.
C. Section 1404 Transfers
Another area of special importance is the relationship between section
14041 and section 1407. The two sections are not mutually exclusive and
it is possible that a case might be subject, at different times, to transfers
pursuant to both of them. 34 A case begun in one forum might be trans-
ferred to a second one pursuant to section 1404 and then transferred for
pretrial proceedings under section 1407. Similarly, a case begun in one
district might be transferred for pretrial discovery under section 1407
and then transferred for all purposes pursuant to section 1404 after it
had been remanded by the Panel. Recently, several cases'20 transferred
under section 1407 for pretrial proceedings have subsequently been trans-
ferred under section 1404, one3 6 for the limited purpose of trial on the
issue of liability only.
A 1404 transfer is far more serious than the more limited and tem-
porary 1407 transfer. A 1407 transfer, unlike a 1404 transfer, must, ac-
cording to the statute, be returned to the original forum for trial and
131. E.g., Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (NJ). Ill. 1969). No
appellate review has been reported challenging the right of the transferee court to make the
class action determination.
132. In re Master Key, 320 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (JPML 1971).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964). See text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
134. In re Grain Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402 (JPML 1969); In re Air Crash Disaster
At Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323 (JPML 1969).
135. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., No. 43 (D.N.H., June 3, 1971);
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, Admin. Order No.
71-5 (S.D.N.Y., May 14, 1971); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., No. 67 C 1899
(ND. Ill., March 23, 1971).
136. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., No. 43 (D.N.H., June 3, 1971).
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final disposition. Thus, section 1404 motions are generally vigorously
opposed. The determination of the motion is vitally important and the
decision may depend upon which court rules on it, since a party opposing
transfer may receive more understanding and sympathetic treatment
in his home forum than in an unfamiliar court. In the local court a case is
more likely to be treated as an individual matter with appropriate con-
sideration given to the convenience of the specific parties and local wit-
nesses. On the other hand, if the motion is before a distant transferee
court, that court may be more inclined to view the entire litigation as
a complex whole rather than weigh the convenience of the parties and
witnesses in the particular case. For example, in a serious personal injury
case a transferee court having responsibility for consolidated pretrial
liability discovery may be inclined to put greater emphasis on the liability
witnesses than on the damage witnesses. Even though judicial economy
is not a factor to be considered in a 1404 transfer motion, if the motion
is before the transferee court it may give consideration to the familiarity
it has acquired with the case, concluding that it would be more efficient
for it to keep all the cases rather than permit them to be returned to
transferor judges unfamiliar with the cases. If the transferee judge rules
on the 1404 motion, he may also be inclined to downgrade the need for
supplemental local discovery and local witnesses despite its recognized
importance in each case. The unfortunate result, therefore, is that differ-
ent standards may be applied depending upon whether the 1404 motion
is decided by the transferee or the transferor court.
This danger is highlighted by several recent decisions where section
1407 transferee judges have undertaken to rule on 1404 transfer motions.
In In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions, 37 the court specifically disregarded the rights and interests of
the parties in the individual cases, stating:
The Court is not considering the transfer of one case from one district to another but
rather the transfer and consolidation of 32 cases filed in twelve districts into one dis-
trict for trial. Thus, instead of looking to the individual convenience of each party
and each witness, the Court must look to the overall convenience of all parties and
witnesses.' 38
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, New Hampshire,1'2 the
court transferred, under section 1404, to the District of New Hampshire
for the limited purpose of liability only, all cases previously transferred
to it pursuant to section 1407. However, the court at least realized that in-
dividual differences existed and refused to order transfer of the cases for
137. Admin. Order No. 71-5 (S.D.N.Y., May 14, 1971).
138. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
139. No. 43 (D.N.H., June 3, 1971).
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assessment of damages. It recognized that the damage issue in each case was
distinct, that the convenience of the parties and witnesses would be better
served by a trial in the originating district, that there was a difference in
composition and attitude of juries, and that to force the transferee court
to try each damage case would impose upon it a sizeable burden, result-
ing in both delay in trial and injustice to each plaintiff. 4 '
The Panel's decisions have demonstrated its inexorable progress to-
ward suggesting that a transferee court should rule on a 1404 transfer
motion, despite the language' 4 ' and legislative history'4 of section 1407,
which clearly indicate that the cases must be remanded to the transferor
district. It had originally appeared to be a futile exercise for a 1407
transferee court to rule on a 1404 transfer motion. However, after some
uncertainty, the Panel has apparently concluded that consolidation of
multidistrict litigation beyond the pretrial phase would enhance judicial
efficiency. It also seems to have concluded that the transferee judge,
who has supervised the pretrial phase, would be more inclined to order
a transfer under section 1404 than would a disinterested judge who,
sitting in the originating district, evaluates the matter after remand of
the 1407 case. 43
In an early case, the Panel had stated that the transferor judge "may
consider transfer of the cases for trial under Section 1404(a) following
completion of pretrial proceedings."'1 44 It then shifted its emphasis to
state that "the appropriate court [could consider] the possibility of trans-
ferring these cases for trial under Section 1404(a) when pretrial pro-
140. Id. at 2-3.
141. Section 1407 provides that the case "shall be remanded by the panel at or before
the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred un-
less it shall have been previously terminated . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
142. As stated by the Senate Judiciary Committee: "Paragraph (a) also requires trans-
ferred cases to be remanded to the originating district at the close of coordinated pretrial
proceedings. The bill does not, therefore, include the trial of cases in the consolidated pro-
ceedings. The experience of the Coordinating Committee was limited to pretrial matters, and
your committee consequently considers it desirable to keep this legislative proposal within
the confines of that experience. Additionally, trial in the originating district is generally prefer-
able from the standpoint of the parties and witnesses, and from the standpoint of the courts
it would be impracticable to have all cases in mass litigation tried in one district. Finally, the
committee recognizes that in most cases there will be a need for local discovery proceedings
to supplement coordinated discovery proceedings, and that consequently remand to the orig-
inating district for this purpose will be desirable." S. Rep. 454 at S.
143. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., No. 43 (D.N.H., June 3, 1971);
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, Admin. Order No.
71-5 (S.D.N.Y., May 14, 1971); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., No. 67 C 1899
(ND. Ill., March 23, 1971).
144. In re Mid-Air Collision Near Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039, 1040 (JPML
1969).
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ceedings are complete,' 1 4 r but never defined what it meant by the
"appropriate court." Finally, the Panel adopted Rule 15 of its Rules of
Procedure which explicitly proclaimed the Panel's view that a transferee
court may rule on a 1404 motion:
Actions will be remanded to the district from which they were transferred unless an
order has been signed by the designated transferee judge transferring an action to
another district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Such actions
will be remanded by the Panel to the district designated in the section 1404(a) or
section 1406(a) order.' 46
The courts 47 that have ruled pursuant to Rule 15 have given little
real consideration to the language of section 1407 or to the legislative
history which clearly expressed the intent that the cases were to be
remanded to the transferor court. Since the transfers involved multiple
cases, the rights, interests and convenience of the individual parties were
swept aside in the drive toward apparent judicial economy. While there
may be merit in effecting consolidation of some cases for determination
of liability, it is regrettable that this has been done by sacrificing the
rights of the individual parties and through judicial rewriting of section
1407.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Within the last ten years the federal courts have experienced an enor-
mous expansion of their caseload. The expansion has been due in large
part to recent rulings in the criminal law area but also to the development
of new or previously underutilized types of civil actions. Multidistrict
litigation, particularly in such commercial fields as antitrust, securities
fraud, environmental protection, and patent infringement, has contributed
greatly to the pressure already on the courts. As a result, new adminis-
trative procedures have had to be developed to meet these problems. The
experience with massive civil antitrust litigation such as the Electrical
Equipment Cases led to the enactment of section 1407 which has been a
valuable tool for improved judicial administration. The Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation has wisely used 1407 transfers and consoli-
dations to handle massive and complex antitrust and securities cases. The
145. In re Grain Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (JPMIL 1969); see In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., 314 F. Supp. 62, 63 (JPML 1970); In re Silver Bridge Dis-
aster, 311 F. Supp. 1345, 1346 (JPML 1970).
146. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, R. 15, 50
F.R.D. 203, 209 (1970), superseded by Panel R. 15, at 15,771. In its recently revised rules
the Panel has again reaffirmed its view that actions transferred under section 1407 need
not be remanded to the originating district. Panel R. 15, at 15,771.
147. See, e.g., cases cited at note 135 supra.
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Panel has also avoided serious confusion and chaos by applying section
1407 where competing class actions were involved.
However, section 1407 treatment has, at times, been meted out in
cases to which it was never intended to apply. It has been applied where
there were few common questions of fact, where the factual issues were
not significant to the litigation, and where only a few cases were in-
volved. At times, the Panel has ordered transfer without giving full con-
sideration to the impact it would have on the litigants, even though
transfers cause "inherent inconvenience" and hardship.
Because of the hardship caused by the transfers, each case requires
that the factors in favor of transfer and those in opposition to it be
given due consideration. Inflexible rules should be rejected in favor of
an analysis of the relevant factors in each case. Additionally, a careful
analysis should be undertaken to determine if transfer and consolidation
does result in any substantial efficiency or economy to the courts and the
parties in each type of case handled by the Panel. In theory, transfer and
consolidation should result in economy and efficiency. However, reality
and theory do not always coincide. As indicated previously, 148 practical
experience in aviation cases has demonstrated that, in such cases, 1407
transfers did not result in any saving of time, money or effort, nor did
they shorten the litigation. The same may be true of other fields which
should, therefore, be objectively examined.
A careful study by the Judicial Conference and the Panel may deter-
mine that the expected benefits of section 1407 have not accrued. It may
lead to the conclusion that section 1407 should be applied with greater
discrimination and that time, money and judicial manpower would be
saved if many types of cases were permitted to proceed in the normal
manner, without forced consolidation and transfer. In any event, it is
time for the Panel to reevaluate and redefine the future use of section
1407.
148. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
